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Abstract 1 
Background: Evidence emerging from qualitative studies suggests the existence of substantial 2 
variation in how health workers experience Performance-based Financing (PBF) within the 3 
same setting. To date, however, no study has quantified or systematically explored this 4 
within-setting heterogeneity. Considering that differences in health workers’ affective 5 
reactions to PBF likely constitute an important element mediating the effectiveness of PBF in 6 
improving health service delivery, systematic and tangible information will be highly 7 
valuable to policy makers and program managers who aim to maximize positive impacts of 8 
PBF. Our study aimed at contributing to filling this gap in knowledge by quantifying health 9 
workers’ knowledge of, satisfaction with, and perceptions of PBF in Burkina Faso, and 10 
exploring factors associated with heterogeneity therein. 11 
Methods: The study employed a post-intervention cross-sectional  explanatory mixed 12 
methods study design with a dominant quantitative component – a structured survey to a total 13 
of 1314 health workers from 396 intervention health facilities – and a small and focused 14 
qualitative component – key informant interviews with five program managers – to 15 
triangulate and further elucidate the quantitative findings. Quantitative data were analyzed 16 
descriptively as well as using three-level mixed-effects models. Qualitative data were 17 
analyzed in a largely deductive process along the quantitative variables and results.  18 
Results: Health workers were on average moderately satisfied with PBF overall, with a slight 19 
tendency towards the positive and large variation between individuals. Two-thirds of health 20 
workers did not have adequate basic knowledge of key PBF elements. Perceived fairness of 21 
the performance evaluation process, of the bonus distribution process, and satisfaction with 22 
the individual financial bonuses varied dramatically between respondents. Factors associated 23 
with heterogeneity in knowledge, satisfaction, and fairness perceptions included higher 24 
responsibility at the facility, general work attitudes, management factors, and training in and 25 
length of exposure to PBF.  26 
Conclusion: Findings imply that investments into staff training on PBF and manager training 27 
on organizational change processes might be beneficial to positive staff attitudes towards 28 
PBF, which in turn would likely contribute to improving the effectiveness of PBF.  29 
 30 
 31 
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Implications for policy makers 32 
• In Burkina Faso, health workers varied greatly their knowledge of and satisfaction 33 
with PBF three years into the implementation  34 
• Knowledge of and satisfaction with PBF varied with general work attitudes, 35 
management factors, training in and length of exposure to PBF, and amount of 36 
individual financial incentives   37 
• Findings indicate that investments into staff training on PBF and manager training on 38 
organizational change processes will likely be beneficial to positive staff attitudes 39 
towards PBF, thereby contributing to improving desired behavior change 40 
 41 
Implications for public 42 
The study shows that three years into implementations, knowledge of and satisfaction with 43 
PBF varied greatly among health workers in Burkina Faso. Health workers with more 44 
positive general attitudes were found to have higher satisfaction with PBF, but also those who 45 
perceived their managers to be more supportive, and those who had either received training in 46 
PBF, or had been exposed to PBF from the very beginning of the intervention. The findings 47 
imply that investments in systematic training of health workers in PBF and training of 48 
managers in managing organizational change processes are likely to result in improved health 49 
worker perceptions and satisfaction with the intervention, thereby possibly improving PBF 50 
effectiveness.  51 
 52 
 53 
 54 
 55 
 56 
 57 
 58 
 59 
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Introduction 60 
Performance-based financing (PBF) has received much attention as a strategy to strengthen 61 
health service delivery in low- and middle-income countries (LMIC) in recent years. Studies 62 
on the impact of PBF on health service utilization and quality have shown very mixed 63 
results.1,2,3 Qualitative studies have identified a large variety of factors related to intervention 64 
design, implementation process, and implementation contexts facilitating or hindering PBF 65 
impact.1,4 Given that one of the key mechanisms by which PBF is assumed to effect change is 66 
by motivating health workers to perform better at work,5,6,7 some studies have explored health 67 
workers’ experiences of and satisfaction with PBF. Key themes identified fairly consistently 68 
across countries include positive perceptions on changes in the work environment8-16; 69 
dissatisfaction with common delays in payment of PBF bonuses10,11,14,16,18; and perceived 70 
unfairness of performance verification and reward distribution.10-20  71 
Qualitative studies further suggest important variation in health workers’ experiences of and 72 
satisfaction with PBF within the same country. For instance, in only one out of three districts 73 
in Sierra Leone did health workers reported positive views on being paid according to their 74 
performance.10 In Malawi, dissatisfaction with the individual financial incentives was more 75 
pronounced in district hospitals with large staff numbers than in small health centers with 76 
only a few staff members.13 In Tanzania, large differences in satisfaction with incentive 77 
payments were reported between staff in the reproductive health department, who were the 78 
primary target of PBF and received a higher share of the PBF revenue, and other staff.18  79 
To date, however, evidence on health workers’ experiences and satisfaction with PBF stems 80 
exclusively from qualitative studies with a small scope. Moreover, no study has 81 
systematically explored how health workers’ experiences and satisfaction within the same 82 
country and intervention vary to our knowledge. Considering that differences in health 83 
workers’ reactions to PBF likely constitute an important element mediating the effectiveness 84 
of PBF in improving health service delivery, systematic and tangible information will be 85 
highly valuable to policy makers and program managers who aim to maximize positive 86 
impacts of PBF. Our study aimed at contributing to filling this gap in knowledge by 87 
quantifying health workers’ knowledge of, satisfaction with, and perceptions of towards PBF 88 
in Burkina Faso, and exploring factors associated with variation in knowledge, satisfaction, 89 
and perceptions. In the following, we will use the term “heterogeneity” for such variation in 90 
knowledge, satisfaction, and perceptions between respondents. 91 
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Figure 1: Conceptual model 101 
 102 
Figure 1 illustrates the understanding of how knowledge, perceptions, and satisfaction shape 103 
health workers’ behavioral reaction to PBF which guided our study. This understanding is 104 
grounded in the above-reviewed literature. In essence, we assume that the extent to which 105 
health workers change their workplace behavior in response to PBF is to a substantial extent 106 
determined by health workers’ satisfaction with PBF, in that individuals’ likelihood to change 107 
their behavior in alignment with PBF objectives is higher the higher their satisfaction with the 108 
intervention, other factors held constant. We further assume that satisfaction, in turn, is 109 
influenced by health workers’ levels of knowledge of the intervention and judgements 110 
regarding procedural fairness, particularly such in relation to performance evaluation and the 111 
individual bonus payment. We assume that the higher knowledge levels and fairness 112 
perceptions are, the more satisfied an individual will be. Finally, we assume that knowledge, 113 
fairness evaluations, and satisfaction are shaped by a large number of factors at the individual 114 
and organizational level, such as general work-related attitudes and the work environment 115 
into which PBF is implemented.  In line with the mixed-methods and exploratory nature of 116 
our work, Figure 1 is meant as an illustration of key factors and relationships aiming at 117 
guiding the study, but leaving room for detailed factors and relationships to emerge from the 118 
data, rather than as a deterministic model of variables and relationships to be tested.  119 
 120 
Individual-level factors (e.g. demographic characteristics, general work-related attitudes and perceptions, 
experiences with PBF, other prior experiences)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Facility-level and higher organization-level factors (PBF-related, e.g. performance in PBF, and PBF-
unrelated, e.g. staffing) 
Satisfaction 
with PBF 
Perceptions of PBF 
Behavioral 
reactions to PBF 
Knowledge of PBF 
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Methods 121 
Study setting 122 
Despite improvements over the last years, Burkina Faso continues to suffer from a high 123 
burden of morbidity and mortality, with a maternal mortality ratio of 371 per 100,000 live 124 
births and an under-five mortality rate of 88.6 per 1000 live births (2015).21 Health services 125 
are provided primarily by the public sector in a multi-tier district health system.22 Health 126 
facilities upkeep their operations through a mix of government in-kind inputs and revenues 127 
from user fees and drug sales.23 Formal health care service utilization rates have improved 128 
substantially in recent years, but remain below target.24 Quality of health services, however, 129 
is often substandard25-27 for reasons including low pay, substandard infrastructure and 130 
equipment, poor supervision, shortages in drugs and other supplies, and few incentives for 131 
high performance.22,28-30 132 
 133 
Performance-based Financing in Burkina Faso 134 
Against this background, PBF was first introduced in 2011 as a pilot scheme in three health 135 
districts to improve access to and quality of care. Given an initially promising evaluation,31 136 
PBF was scaled up to another 12 districts between 2014 and 2018, implemented by the 137 
Ministry of Health (MoH) with financial support by the World Bank’s Health Results 138 
Innovation Trust Fund. The intervention and its background and context are described in 139 
detail elsewhere.32,33 Although the primary objective was to improve utilization and quality of 140 
maternal and child health services, the intervention effectively included a broad range of 141 
primary- and secondary-level services, including also curative care, TB, and HIV services. In 142 
brief, health facilities signed contracts with the MoH stipulating the services purchased by 143 
PBF, a comprehensive list of quality indicators, and payment modalities. Facilities reported 144 
volume of provided services on a monthly basis. Reports were then verified by an external 145 
agency and facilities subsequently paid a pre-defined amount (‘subsidies’) for each service 146 
provided. Subsidies per provided service ranged from 100 FCFA (≈ 0,15 EUR) for curative 147 
outpatient consultations to 8500 FCFA (≈ 13 EUR) for a cured tuberculosis case. Facilities 148 
were further categorized into 9 equity categories based on staffing levels and remoteness, and 149 
less privileged facilities received proportionally higher subsidies. Quality was verified by the 150 
District Health Management Teams (DHMT) on a quarterly basis. If quality scores surpassed 151 
50% (later changed to 60%) of the maximum, facilities were paid a quality bonus 152 
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proportional to their service volume and quality level. PBF payments came on top of pre-153 
existing financing structures. Initially, facilities were free to spend PBF funds as they wished, 154 
for facility-related investments or as staff bonuses. From October 2016 on, to encourage more 155 
intensive investments, staff bonuses were limited to 60% of the revenue from PBF, whereas 156 
at least 40% had to be invested to improve the infrastructure or equipment of the health 157 
facility. Facilities were provided with a financial management tool called ‘outil d’indice’. 158 
This also included a calculator to determine bonus amounts for individual staff members, 159 
based on five criteria. In some health facilities, following a randomization process in the 160 
context of an impact evaluation,32 the standard PBF was further complemented with measures 161 
intended to increase equity in impact. 162 
An impact evaluation of the extended PBF trial showed limited overall effects of PBF, with 163 
positive impact only on the utilization of facility-based delivery and postnatal care as well as 164 
on certain input dimensions of quality of care, but no impact on the utilization of other 165 
services or process quality.34 A process evaluation of the first twelve months of 166 
implementation underlined that although the intervention was implemented as planned in 167 
most respects, there were a number of important challenges, most notably delays in setting up 168 
the verification process and in payment of the subsidies.35,36  169 
 170 
Study design 171 
We used a post-intervention cross-sectional explanatory mixed methods study design with a 172 
dominant quantitative component and a small and focused qualitative component. The 173 
quantitative component employed a structured survey to health workers in all intervention 174 
health facilities to quantify the elements printed in bold in Figure 1, namely health workers’ 175 
satisfaction with PBF overall as well as knowledge and perceptions related to the key issues 176 
having emerged repeatedly in previous research, performance evaluation and individual 177 
bonus payments. The quantitative survey further served to quantify associations with key 178 
individual- and facility-level determinants. The qualitative component employed key 179 
informant interviews with program managers to triangulate and further elucidate the 180 
quantitative findings. It also served to capture factors and dynamics which we had not 181 
included in the quantitative survey, allowing us to place quantified associations into context. 182 
Qualitative interviews were performed after a descriptive analysis of the quantitative data, 183 
and results then used to further inform quantitative analyses of heterogeneity in knowledge, 184 
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perceptions, and satisfaction. Specifically, results from the qualitative study component led us 185 
to obtain and include in the final models additional quantitative data on facility performance 186 
as described in more detail below.  187 
 188 
Quantitative study component 189 
Design and sample. Quantitative data were collected in the context of the above-mentioned 190 
impact evaluation. The study design and sampling procedures are described in detail in De 191 
Allegri et al (2019).32 In brief, the study included all 396 primary-level health care facilities 192 
in all 12 purposely selected intervention health districts that newly received PBF in 2014. In 193 
line with the specific objectives set for the study presented in this paper, we only used endline 194 
data, collected between April and June 2017, approximately three years after the introduction 195 
of PBF. 196 
In each health facility, we included all clinical skilled personnel who had worked at the health 197 
facility for at least three months and who were present on the day of the study team visit, 198 
resulting in a total of 1314 health workers (health workers per facility: mean=3.3, sd=1.7, 199 
min=1, max=11). Table 1 provides an overview over the distribution of basic demographic 200 
and PBF-related characteristics in the sample.  201 
Data sources and data collection process. Data was collected with a French-language 202 
structured survey administered to all sampled health workers by trained interviewers. The 203 
survey assessed overall satisfaction with the PBF intervention as well knowledge and 204 
perceptions of the performance evaluation process and the individual incentives as outlined 205 
above (six variables in total, referred to as “outcome variables” in the following). The 206 
questionnaire also included questions on demographics, working conditions and perceived 207 
working environment, motivation, and clinical knowledge. Questionnaire sections pertaining 208 
to satisfaction, attitudes, perceptions, and other psychological aspects were administered in 209 
the hybrid mode described in Lohmann et al (2017),37 whereby interviewers read questions, 210 
statements, and answer options to the respondents, but respondents entered their answers 211 
themselves into the tablet computers used for data collection so as to maximize perceived 212 
confidentiality and reduce answer biases. We extracted data on facility catchment population, 213 
staffing levels, and patient numbers from a facility assessment also conducted within the 214 
context of the impact evaluation. To complement the quantitative analysis, we further 215 
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Table 1: Quantitative sample characteristics 216 
 217 
 N % 
Total 1314 100 
Sex   
     Female 689 52.4 
     Male 625 47.6 
Health worker type*   
     Nurse 522 39.7 
     Midwife 153 11.7 
     Assistant midwife 330 25.1 
     AIS 309 23.5 
Responsibility   
     Health facility in-charge 414 31.5 
     Staff member 900 68.5 
PBF exposure   
     From the intervention start 767 58.4 
     From later 547 41.6 
 mean sd 
Years in health care service 5.9 5.0 
* Nurse = Infirmier Diplômé d’Etat, Infirmier breveté; Midwife = Sage-Femme 
d'Etat/Maïeuticien d'Etat; Assistant midwife = Accoucheuse Brevetée, 
Accoucheuse Auxilliaire; AIS = Agent Itinérant de Santé (preventive services 
and outreach) 
 
 218 
 219 
obtained program data on facility performance on quality indicators and on facility equity 220 
categories. Outcome variables as well as potential determinants of heterogeneity are aligned 221 
with the conceptual understanding described earlier and detailed in Table 2. 222 
Analysis. We first performed descriptive analyses of each of the six outcome variables. For 223 
each, we then employed three-level (individual, health facility, district) mixed-effects linear 224 
(for Likert-type variables as per standard psychometric practice39) or logistic (for 225 
dichotomous variables) regression to explore determinants of heterogeneity, using the 226 
‘mixed’ and ‘xtmelogit’ commands in Stata 14.2, respectively. Specifically, we modeled 227 
associations of the outcome variables with observed individual- and facility-level factors at 228 
level 1 as fixed effects, and further accounted for the organizational environment by 229 
modeling facility and district random intercepts at levels 2 (health facility) and 3 (district). 230 
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Table 2: Variables and their measurement 231 
 232 
Variable 
Measurement 
Data source 
Question Response  
      Outcome variables: PBF knowledge, satisfaction, and perceptions  
Overall satisfaction with 
PBF 
“How satisfied are you with PBF 
overall?” 
Scale from 0 “not 
satisfied at all” to 10 
“completely satisfied” 
Health 
worker 
survey 
Knowledge performance 
evaluation2 
Correct recall of result of last quality 
verification (+/- 5 points on the 0-100 
scale used by the PBF program) 
0=did not know or 
incorrectly recalled last 
result; 1=correctly 
recalled last result 
Perceived fairness 
performance evaluation1 
“Did you find this result fair or unfair 
considering the performance of your 
health facility?” 
Scale from 0 “not fair 
at all” to 10 
“completely fair” 
Knowledge bonus 
distribution 
Correct recall of who set the bonus 
distribution mode and according to 
which criteria bonuses are distributed 
(min 4 out of 5)  
0=insufficient 
knowledge; 
1=sufficient knowledge 
Perceived fairness bonus 
distribution 
“Do you think that the system of bonus 
distribution among staff members is 
fair or unfair?” 
Scale from 0 “not fair 
at all” to 10 
“completely fair” 
Satisfaction with 
earnings from PBF2 
“How satisfied are you with the bonus 
payments you receive?” 
Scale from 0 “not 
satisfied at all” to 10 
“completely satisfied” 
Determinants of heterogeneity:  Basic health worker characteristics 
Sex, health worker type, seniority, responsibility,  (see Table 1) 
Health 
worker 
survey 
Clinical knowledge 
High or intermediate knowledge on pregnancy-related 
complications (midwives) or common childhood illnesses (nurses, 
AIS), measured with vignettes38 
 
Determinants of heterogeneity:  General work attitudes 
Overall work motivation 
“In the last 7 days, to what extent were 
you motivated to work?” 
Scale from 0 “not 
motivated at all” to 10 
“completely 
motivated” Health 
worker 
survey 
Autonomous (intrinsic) 
motivation 
Measures with six intrinsic motivation and integrated/identified 
regulation items37 
External motivation 
Measured with four external regulation items pertaining to 
economic aspects of extrinsic motivation37 
Determinants of heterogeneity:  PBF-related factors 
Perceived supportive 
supervision 
Measured with four items, e.g. “My 
supervisor is always there for me when 
I need help in my work.” 
Scale from 0 “do not 
agree at all” to 10 
“fully agree” 
Health 
worker 
survey 
PBF training Having received formal training in PBF 0=no; 1=yes 
PBF exposure Having been working at a PBF facility 
when PBF was introduced (versus 
having joined the facility when PBF 
was already on-going) 
0=no (exposure from 
later); 1=yes (exposure 
from start) 
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 Determinants of heterogeneity:  Facility characteristics 
Quality of care at 
intervention start  
On 27 structural and process quality dimensions, verified 
quarterly by the DHMTs through a detailed checklist with over 
100 individual indicators33; scores theoretically range from 0 to 
100 Program 
data 
Quality of care at time of 
data collection  
PBF equity category 
Program facility classification based on 
staffing levels, remoteness of 
catchment population, and remoteness 
from district hospital 
1=most privileged, 
9=least privileged 
Number of clinical staff Total number of clinical facility staff 
Facility 
assessment Staff-patient ratio 
Total number of patients in month before data collection divided 
by number of clinical skilled staff 
1 Only health workers who reported to know the last evaluation results were asked to judge on its fairness 
2 27% of the sample (distributed across all cadres, responsibility levels, sexes, etc.) reported not to receive any 
bonus payments. However, since the question might have been misunderstood to exclude PBF bonuses, we 
included in the results shown in Figure 3a only those respondents who reported to receive bonus payments.  
 233 
 234 
Qualitative study component 235 
Design and sample. To triangulate and validate the quantitative findings and to better 236 
understand observed heterogeneity in PBF knowledge, perceptions, and satisfaction, we 237 
performed key informant interviews with the five program managers in the MoH PBF unit 238 
who had followed program implementation from the start. We opted to interview program 239 
managers rather than health workers as in their supervisory role, they were in constant 240 
contact with health workers enrolled in PBF and therefore had the best possible oversight 241 
over the spectrum of PBF knowledge, perceptions, and satisfaction among the health 242 
workforce.  243 
Data collection process. The first and the second author conducted all interviews in French, 244 
adopting a strategy previously agreed upon by all authors. Respondents were shown the 245 
quantitative results presented in Figures 2-4 and asked to comment on them, with 246 
interviewers probing for more in-depth information where necessary (“Does this surprise you 247 
in any way?”; “Does this correspond to what you have experienced on the ground, or did you 248 
have different perceptions?”; “From your perceptions on the ground, what were the reasons 249 
for these variations?”). Interviews were audio recorded and verbatim transcribed. Written 250 
informed consent was obtained prior to each interview. 251 
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Analysis. The first and second author independently coded the French material in a mostly 252 
deductive process along a predefined codebook, with initial codes that mirrored the 253 
quantitative variables in Table 2. The two authors further integrated a few new codes that 254 
emerged in vivo as they proceeded through the transcribed material. The independent 255 
analyses advanced by the two authors were discussed among all authors and minor 256 
discrepancies in emerging interpretations resolved by referring back to the data and/or by 257 
relating findings to the context of the intervention. Quotes illustrating main findings were 258 
selected and translated from French to English for the purpose of publication.  259 
 260 
Results 261 
Quantitative and qualitative findings are jointly presented in the following section, organized 262 
along three main topics: overall satisfaction with PBF; knowledge and perceptions regarding 263 
performance evaluation; and knowledge and perceptions regarding individual bonuses.  264 
 265 
Overall satisfaction with PBF 266 
Figure 2 shows that health workers were on average moderately satisfied with PBF overall, 267 
although with substantial variation. Program managers confirmed that these findings 268 
correspond to their own perceptions of health workers’ satisfaction with the intervention.  269 
 270 
 271 
Figure 2: Distribution of respondents’ scores pertaining to their overall satisfaction with 272 
PBF 273 
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 274 
Personally, I think that this [result] is right. It depends on what they experience 275 
in each health facility. Some are satisfied because with PBF, they have felt a 276 
change. Others are not satisfied because what they expected was not what 277 
happened. (R1) 278 
Specifically, program managers reported that in their perception, most health workers 279 
appreciated PBF for leading to improvements in their work places, for helping them develop 280 
their skills, and for improving the care their patients were able to receive. Four out of five 281 
managers saw these as the most important factors in determining health workers’ satisfaction 282 
with PBF. In contrast, one program manager perceived the individual financial incentives as 283 
the most important satisfying factor. 284 
There are people who are satisfied, who say that regardless of the payment, the 285 
positive effect that PBF has on their professional training, on their career, is very 286 
beneficial. (R3) 287 
People were able to equip themselves, in terms of medical equipment, 288 
construction, there was quite a bit of improvement. That can only increase the 289 
level of satisfaction. (R4) 290 
The factor that makes people satisfied is first and foremost the financial 291 
motivation. Because today people are too hooked on money. (R4) 292 
All respondents underlined that most health workers were also generally happy with the 293 
program objectives, indicator set, and procedures. 294 
At the same time, program managers perceived several factors to have impacted satisfaction 295 
negatively, most importantly the following two. First, the substantial delays in payment 296 
incurred by the program at various points in time weighed on many health workers’ general 297 
satisfaction.  298 
There is an aftertaste that has remained from PBF. Many have lamented the late 299 
payments and when asking them about their appreciation of PBF, because of that 300 
only, they say they are not satisfied. (R3) 301 
Second, a number of design changes were made during the course of implementation, most 302 
notably a significant reduction in price levels for various indicators and the introduction of a 303 
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proportional investment requirement, which in combination lowered subsidy amounts both 304 
for the facility and particularly for individual staff members. Against this context, one 305 
program manager reflected on the importance of starting with realistic price levels.  306 
Lessons learned ... we need to pay attention to prices. Once they are high and you 307 
reduce ... unfortunately, we started high, the money ran out, we had to lower 308 
prices. It affected [satisfaction] ... (R2) 309 
In explaining heterogeneity in overall satisfaction with PBF, program managers underlined 310 
the importance of individual differences in general attitudes towards work.  311 
The people who are not satisfied are usually those who do not want to work, 312 
because when you talk with them, they tell you that with PBF, you write a lot, 313 
there is a lot of work to be done, and the money you give us is not much. (R4) 314 
They also pointed out that health workers held different ideas and expectations about how the 315 
program ought to benefit them, influencing the extent of their overall satisfaction. 316 
Those for whom PBF is mostly about money, they will tell you that it is not good 317 
because payments are late and so on. However, others for whom it improves and 318 
strengthens their skills, allows them to work in good conditions, and so on, they 319 
think it's good and many are in this mindset. (R3) 320 
Results of the quantitative heterogeneity analysis (Table 3) support this notion, showing that 321 
health workers with higher overall satisfaction with PBF tended to have higher general and 322 
autonomous (intrinsic) work motivation, but – somewhat contrary to program managers’ 323 
perceptions – be generally more motivated by economic considerations.   324 
Quantitative results further show a positive relationship between perceived supportive 325 
supervision and satisfaction with PBF. Health workers in facilities assigned to a higher equity 326 
category, signaling disadvantage in terms of geographic remoteness and staffing levels and 327 
leading to proportionally higher PBF subsidies and bonuses, also tended to be more satisfied 328 
with PBF overall. Beyond this, results show substantial residual variation between districts 329 
and health facilities.  330 
 331 
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Table 3: Multivariate results 
 Overall 
satisfaction with 
PBF 
Performance evaluation Bonus distribution Satisfaction with 
earnings from 
PBF 
Knowledge Perceived 
fairness 
Knowledge Perceived fairness 
 Coef. p Coef. p Coef. p Coef. p Coef. p Coef. p 
Health worker characteristics: basic             
  Health worker sex: male -0.10 0.54 0.75 0.00 0.16 0.27 0.15 0.40 -0.07 0.72 -0.11 0.62 
  Health worker type (base: Nurse)       
     Midwife -0.51 0.81 0.24 0.41 -0.01 0.97 -0.37 0.88 0.01 0.98 0.55 0.07 
     Assistant midwife -0.21 0.32 -0.29 0.27 0.12 0.54 -0.56 0.02 -1.62 0.00 0.39 0.20 
     AIS -0.12 0.92 -0.41 0.10 0.13 0.45 -0.28 0.20 -0.94 0.00 0.44 0.10 
  Responsibility: Facility in-charge 0.06 0.76 0.61 0.01 0.26 0.10 1.34 0.00 0.82 0.00 0.33 0.18 
  Health worker seniority 0.01 0.56 -0.01 0.58 -0.01 0.33 -0.00 0.90 0.01 0.40 0.02 0.28 
  Clinical knowledge: high/interm. -0.21 0.86 0.06 0.78 0.03 0.82 0.60 0.00 -0.04 0.82 0.18 0.39 
Health worker characteristics: 
general work attitudes             
  Overall work motivation 0.24 0.00 0.04 0.23 0.10 0.00 0.03 0.28 0.15 0.00 0.17 0.00 
  Autonomous motivation 0.12 0.04 0.07 0.38 0.11 0.03 -0.05 0.41 0.01 0.89 -0.10 0.19 
  External motivation 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.93 0.02 0.54 -0.04 0.24 0.12 0.00 0.13 0.00 
Health worker characteristics:  
PBF-related variables             
  Perceived supportive supervision 0.12 0.00 0.06 0.30 0.17 0.00 0.07 0.17 0.28 0.00 0.17 0.01 
  PBF training: received 0.01 0.94 0.36 0.07 0.18 0.15 0.89 0.00 0.27 0.11 0.10 0.58 
  PBF exposure: from the start -0.05 0.73 0.51 0.01 0.22 0.08 -0.06 0.71 0.19 0.24 -0.03 0.89 
  PBF knowledge: correct/sufficient - - - - 0.92 0.52 - - 0.59 0.00 -0.13 0.48 
  Fairness perceptions - - - - - - - - - - 0.34 0.00 
Facility characteristics             
  Quality of care at baseline 0.00 0.87 0.02 0.21 -0.01 0.07 0.01 0.50 0.00 0.63 0.00 0.83 
  Quality of care at data collection 0.00 0.92 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.68 -0.01 0.20 -0.01 0.22 
  PBF equity category 0.18 0.02 -0.06 0.62 0.17 0.00 0.05 0.51 -0.02 0.77 0.26 0.00 
  Number of clinical staff 0.00 0.77 -0.08 0.00 0.01 0.41 -0.01 0.50 -0.02 0.10 -0.01 0.53 
  Clinical staff-patient ratio 0.00 0.31 -0.00 0.53 0.00 0.64 0.00 0.34 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.57 
Cluster-level variance  Coef. 
95% 
CI Coef. 
95% 
CI Coef. 
95% 
CI Coef. 
95% 
CI Coef. 
95% 
CI Coef. 
95% 
CI 
  District 0.30 0.11, 0.80 0.85 0.51,1.41 0.06 0.01, 0.30 0.61 0.38, 1.00 0.17 0.05, 0.58 0.19 0.04, 0.82 
  Health facility 0.48 0.26, 0.87 1.49 1.19, 1.86 0.44 0.26, 0.75 0.19 
0.00, 
12.06 
0.50 0.25, 0.98 0.82 0.44, 1.54 
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 339 
Knowledge and attitudes regarding performance evaluation  340 
As Figure 3a shows, two thirds of health workers were able to correctly recall their facility’s 341 
last quality performance score. Program managers were not surprised by this finding. 342 
That does not surprise me. Because when we do the evaluations, people are 343 
interested because they know they have money in it. So they know [the results]. 344 
(R4) 345 
Aside from monetary aspects, program managers underlined the competitive element in PBF 346 
leading health workers to know their scores.  347 
The comparison of quality scores, it touches the ego of the health facility in-348 
charges. When they return to the health facility, they talk about it. And they call 349 
each other, "We had so much, you, how much did you have? We were better than 350 
you! [The scores] remain engraved in the heads of their staff, they know what 351 
they had. (R3) 352 
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3a) Proportion of respondents having 
correctly recalled the result of the last 
performance evaluation result 
3b) Distribution of respondents’ perceived fairness scores 
regarding the performance evaluation process 
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They further explained that processes are set in a way that all staff members should be 353 
informed, even though usually only facility and department management staff participate 354 
actively in the verification exercise. In correspondence with this, results of the quantitative 355 
heterogeneity analysis (Table 3) show significantly higher knowledge levels among facility 356 
in-charges. Quantitative findings further show substantially higher knowledge levels among 357 
health workers who had been working in intervention facilities at the start of PBF, and – with 358 
marginal statistical significance – who had received PBF training.  Findings detected 359 
substantial variation by district and particularly by health facility. 360 
At the same time, program managers voiced disappointment that knowledge levels were not 361 
higher. In explaining shortfalls from a 100% knowledge level, they mentioned particularly 362 
three aspects, beyond individual variation in memory and interest. First, it appeared that not 363 
all facilities practiced knowledge sharing as intended, in part because the verification teams 364 
did not always spend as much time at the facility as originally intended. Quantitative findings 365 
imply that knowledge sharing might be a particular problem in facilities with higher numbers 366 
of staff, where knowledge levels were significantly lower. Program managers also pointed at 367 
the importance of the facility in-charge’s initiative, ambition, and leadership qualities in this 368 
regard. Second, it appears that many health workers were mostly interested in whether their 369 
facility surpassed the threshold rendering them eligible for quality bonuses, but did not 370 
necessarily recall the exact score. Third, the payment delays might have contributed in that 371 
they led to a temporal disconnect between verification results and the amount of bonus to be 372 
received, rendering the link less salient and therefore less interesting to health workers.  373 
Figure 3b shows that the majority of health workers perceived fairly high levels of fairness 374 
regarding the performance evaluation process. Program managers confirmed this.  375 
They think it's fair, and they find that the evaluators are rigorous and that the 376 
things they criticize are justified. (R2) 377 
Quantitative results indicate no relationship between correct knowledge of evaluation results 378 
and perceived fairness (Table 3), but health workers with higher perceived fairness tended to 379 
have higher overall motivation, autonomous (intrinsic) motivation, and perceived supportive 380 
supervision. Perceived fairness was also higher in facilities with higher actual quality 381 
performance level at the time of data collection, and with a higher equity category indicating 382 
more severe disadvantage. Controlling for actual knowledge levels, staff who had not been 383 
exposed to PBF from the start of the program, when extensive training happened, tended to 384 
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have lower perceptions of fairness, although this variable only reached marginal significance 385 
as a predictor of perceived fairness. One program manager, however, confirmed that 386 
complaints had been largely limited to new staff. Similar to what was observed for PBF 387 
knowledge, results further indicate substantial variation between facilities and districts. 388 
  389 
Knowledge and attitudes regarding individual bonuses 390 
Figure 4a shows that only about one third of health workers had sufficient knowledge about 391 
the individual bonus distribution, defined as knowing who had decided on the bonus 392 
distribution mode – the PBF program management, correctly answered by 70% – as well as at 393 
least four out of five distribution criteria. Around 80% correctly recalled as distribution 394 
criteria salary category, seniority, and days of absence, respectively, whereas level of 395 
responsibility (i.e. facility in-charge vs. staff member) was only mentioned by 49% and 396 
individual performance evaluation by only 34%.  397 
Program managers confirmed this picture, and provided several explanations for the observed 398 
gaps in knowledge. Generally, although bonus distribution – using the outil d’indice – was 399 
intended to be a participatory process, this was not the case in many facilities, with the health 400 
facility managers often calculating shares in a non-transparent way. This appears to have 401 
somewhat improved over time, but problems persisted throughout the implementation period. 402 
Again, program managers underlined the importance of the health facility manager’s 403 
personality and leadership competence and style in this regard. Further, they stressed the 404 
importance of training in PBF and the general lack thereof for newly affected staff. 405 
Is the outil d’indice filled in a participatory way? If health workers were all 406 
involved in filling it, they would all know the criteria. (R2) 407 
Results of the quantitative heterogeneity analysis (Table 3) correspond to program managers’ 408 
perceptions in that knowledge levels were substantially higher among health facility 409 
managers than regular staff members, and lower for lower-level cadres. Respondents were 410 
more likely to have sufficient knowledge when having received training in PBF, and the 411 
higher their general clinical knowledge.  412 
In regards to the criterion of responsibility, program managers explained that since it only 413 
pertained to the health facility manager, many regular staff members were not aware of it. In  414 
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Figure 4: Knowledge and attitudes regarding individual bonuses 422 
 423 
regards to the individual performance evaluation, they reported that lack of awareness 424 
resulted from evaluations not being done as prescribed in many facilities. They explained that 425 
considering the workload associated with quarterly individual evaluations and the potential 426 
for discontent and conflict, many in-charge’s appeared unwilling to comply. In many 427 
facilities, it seems that staff had come to an understanding to assign the same performance 428 
scores to all staff members. One program manager underlined that not all blame should be put 429 
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on the health facility managers, however, explaining that higher-level leadership issues – 430 
district managers also had not evaluated facility managers as frequently as they should have – 431 
and integration into the existing system – where individual performance evaluation is done 432 
annual rather than quarterly – also played a role. 433 
Figure 4b shows that despite these knowledge gaps, the majority of health workers indicated 434 
fairly high perceived fairness of the bonus distribution mode. Program managers reported a 435 
slightly less positive perception of perceived fairness among health workers, but explained 436 
that cases of perceived unfairness were mostly due to the issue of transparency introduced 437 
above. In support of this, results of the quantitative heterogeneity analysis (Table 3) indicate 438 
that perceived fairness was substantially higher among facility managers and among higher-439 
level cadres in general – who were likely more involved and informed –, as well as among 440 
health workers perceiving their supervisors to be generally supportive.  441 
Perceived fairness was also markedly higher among health workers who had sufficient 442 
knowledge of the distribution mode and among health workers with higher general and/or 443 
external motivation.  444 
Finally, Figure 4c shows large variation in health workers’ overall satisfaction with the 445 
individual bonuses they received. Again, program managers again underlined the key role of 446 
fairness, transparency, and consensus in application of the criteria, while they perceived 447 
absolute amounts earned to be less but not entirely unimportant. 448 
All those who do not agree with the bonuses, they find that their in-charges do 449 
not distribute transparently, that's what creates a lot of problems. [...] Those who 450 
said they are satisfied are from facilities where they have found a consensus on 451 
how to distribute the bonuses. But where there is dissatisfaction, there is no 452 
consensus and there is arbitrariness in it so people are not happy. So it depends 453 
less on the absolute amount but more on the distribution process. (R3) 454 
There are also people complaining about the amount [...]. This happens in two 455 
situations. In health facilities with a lot of staff members who share ... so what 456 
goes to each individual is little. And in very poor performing health facilities that 457 
do not receive much. (R5) 458 
Results of the quantitative heterogeneity analysis (Table 3) confirm the importance of 459 
fairness perceptions and positive perceived supervision. Further, health workers with higher 460 
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overall and external motivation and working in more disadvantaged facilities tended to be 461 
more satisfied with the individual bonuses.  462 
 463 
Discussion 464 
Our study makes an important contribution to the literature by being the first to quantify 465 
health workers’ knowledge and perceptions of PBF and to systematically explore 466 
heterogeneity therein. The results clearly demonstrate that health workers react in very 467 
different ways to the same overall intervention. This corresponds to what prior qualitative 468 
research in other settings had indicated,7-19 Overall satisfaction with PBF was positively 469 
shaped by perceived improvements in working conditions induced by PBF, and negatively 470 
impacted by the payment delays incurred by the program as well as by various design 471 
changes in the implementation period. Overall satisfaction varied with individuals’ general 472 
attitudes towards work, their expectations of who would benefit how from the intervention, 473 
and perceptions of the health facility managers’ supportiveness and transparency. Satisfaction 474 
and perceived fairness of the performance evaluation and bonus distribution process were 475 
primarily related to general work motivation as well as perceptions of the health facility 476 
manager as supportive and transparent. Knowledge levels tended to be higher among 477 
respondents who had received PBF training and/or been exposed to PBF since the start of the 478 
intervention, as well as among health facility managers and generally among higher-qualified 479 
staff.  480 
Hereafter, we wish to focus on the two main messages to take away from the study, namely 481 
on the need for more research on exploring this within-setting heterogeneity demonstrated by 482 
the study, and on the importance of supportive, participatory, and transparent management in 483 
shaping health workers’ experiences of PBF.  484 
To date, the vast majority of studies on PBF has focused on average intervention effects 485 
across all intervention sites. This is particularly true for studies on PBF impact on utilization 486 
and quality of health service provision – we know of no study which has explicitly explored 487 
variation in impacts within the same setting –, but also for studies focused on processes or 488 
intermediate factors such as health worker motivation, with a few notable 489 
exceptions.9,13,16,18,40 Inspecting impact estimate confidence intervals and reading between the 490 
lines of process-focused studies, however, often strongly suggests that this focus on average 491 
effects masks substantial within-setting heterogeneity. This is particularly interesting since 492 
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many impact evaluations have shown no impact of PBF on average, including in Burkina 493 
Faso.34 Certainly, the effects of PBF on health service provision are a highly complex 494 
dynamic in which health workers’ sentiments are only one aspect among many, yet the 495 
results of this study support an emerging criticism of current studies on PBF41: Instead of 496 
investigating average impact in yet another setting, should we not rather focus on 497 
heterogeneity within settings and attempt to understand why some facilities or districts are 498 
flourishing with PBF, while others make no or negative progress? 499 
In practical terms, the results of this study support some of the best practices which have been 500 
propagated by PBF implementation experts for a long time, such as the importance of 501 
training health workers properly in principles and practices of PBF, as well as of participation 502 
and procedural transparency.7 Most importantly, the study underlined the crucial importance 503 
of the facility managers’ managerial skills in a change management process as complex as in 504 
the case of PBF implementation. This resonates findings from another process evaluation of 505 
the PBF intervention in Burkina Faso40 and previous findings for instance in Malawi8 or 506 
Nigeria.42 Clearly, in a setting with severe human resources shortages like Burkina Faso, 507 
appointing only managers with sufficient managerial skill is not a viable option for sheer lack 508 
of qualified candidates to choose from. However, future training measures both within the 509 
context of PBF and beyond might want to focus more on training managers not only in 510 
technical but also in interpersonal aspects of organizational change processes. 511 
One important limitation of our study is that, as in most cross-sectional psychometric 512 
studies,43 respondents’ choice of answer is not solely influenced by their underlying 513 
satisfaction or fairness perceptions. Rather, answers are also determined by individual 514 
differences in interpreting the anchors – at the same underlying satisfaction level, different 515 
respondents will likely choose somewhat different numbers of the 0-10 scale –, by social 516 
desirability aspects related to the specific interview setting and personality, as well as by 517 
other factors such as understanding of the methods. We acknowledge that respondents’ 518 
absolute scores are therefore to be interpreted with some care. However, given the large 519 
sample where individual differences in answer tendencies are likely to have averaged out as 520 
well as the fact that program managers’ perceptions largely corresponded to the quantitative 521 
results, we are confident that this has not influenced the overall messages we take away. 522 
Further limitations include the cross-sectional nature of the study, which does not allow for 523 
true causal inference, and a risk that program managers have had and reported a somewhat 524 
skewed picture of health workers’ true feelings about the intervention. Finally, data regarding 525 
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actual incentive amounts received by individuals were unfortunately of poor quality, so that 526 
we were unable to include this certainly relevant and interesting variable in our models. 527 
 528 
Conclusion 529 
In Burkina Faso, health workers varied greatly their knowledge of, satisfaction with, and 530 
perceptions of PBF three years into the implementation. Factors associated with 531 
heterogeneity included general work attitudes, management factors, as well as training in and 532 
exposure to PBF. Findings imply that investments into staff training on PBF to enhance 533 
knowledge and perceived transparency and into manager training on how to support effective 534 
organizational change processes might be beneficial to positive staff attitudes towards PBF, 535 
which in turn would likely contribute to improving the effectiveness of PBF. Results also 536 
underline the value of shifting focus from average intervention effects to within-setting 537 
heterogeneity in future research so as to provide policy makers and program managers hoping 538 
to maximize positive impacts of PBF with tangible and constructive information.   539 
 540 
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